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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., a t MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Delaware corporation, 
: 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 020903207 
vs. 
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an : 
individual, and SHARLENE REBER, 
an individual, : 
Defendants• : 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on November 6, 
2002, in connection with the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated that it would 
take the matter under advisement to further consider the arguments, 
the relevant case law and statutes and the written submissions of 
the parties. Since taking the Motion under advisement, the Court 
has had an opportunity to consider or reconsider the law, all 
relevant pleadings, facts and the oral arguments in this case. Now 
being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The defendants have filed their Motion to Dismiss, contending 
that they are not liable to the plaintiff under their 1986 
SONY V. VISUAL 
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Guaranty, because the debt at issue was incurred by an entirely 
different entity than the entity whose payment they did guaranty. 
The plaintiff focuses on the fact that the guarantee was not 
revoked and continues to be in effect regardless of the changes 
(in terms of name or officers involved) to Visual Technology, Inc. 
At the outset, the Court notes that there was some issue about 
whether the Court would treat the defendants1 Motion as one for 
summary judgment. The Court reiterates its initial decision to not 
convert the defendants' Motion. Therefore, the only materials that 
the Court referred to in making its decision are the Complaint and 
the documents attached thereto. Having reviewed the factual 
allegations of the Complaint and the accompanying documents, the 
Court determines that there are no facts under which the plaintiff 
can seek to hold the Reber defendants liable under the Guaranty for 
debts incurred by an entity which is entirely different than the 
one they guaranteed payment from. 
Specifically, as the defendants1 counsel clearly articulated 
during oral argument, this case does not involve a change in the 
financial structure or organization of Debtor that is the subject 
of the Guaranty, but rather a new debtor altogether, one that was 
not covered by the Guaranty in the first place. What we have here 
are two parallel corporations who happen to share the same name. 
The first, the corporation whose obligations the Rebers guaranteed, 
SONY V. VISUAL 
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is no longer in existence. The second is a wholly different 
corporation which was formerly known as Dunston-Hill. 
The documents attached to the plaintifffs Complaint evidence 
that the plaintiff entered into a Reseller Agreement with the new 
debtor, Visual Technology, Inc. (II) on August 1, 2001. The 
address for this new debtor differs from the Debtor referenced in 
the Guaranty. From that point, it appears that the plaintiff dealt 
with the signatory to that Agreement, Mr. Jackson, and mailed 
correspondence to the new address. (See letter dated January 10, 
2002, from Mr. Cheng to Mr. Jackson) . These facts demonstrate that 
this case is clearly distinguishable from Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. 
White. 438 Utah Adv.Rep. 5 (Utah App. 2002), which the plaintiff 
strongly relies on. The guarantor in Mule-Hide had not revoked 
her guarantee when the company that was the subject of her 
guarantee placed an order from Mule-Hide, which order was 
subsequently delivered and accepted. The facts in this case 
demonstrate that it was not the company that the Rebers guaranteed 
that had ordered and received products from the plaintiff, the debt 
for which is the subject of this action. Rather, it was the Visual 
Technology, Inc. (II), located at Bearcat Drive, whose president 
was Mr. Jackson, that ordered the products pursuant to an entirely 
new Agreement that the Rebers were not even parties to. Under the 
facts alleged in the Complaint and in light of the documents 
SONY V. VISUAL 
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attached to the Complaint, there is no plausible way that the 
Rebers can be held liable undetr the Guaranty. Accordingly, the 
Court grants the Rebers1 Motion to Dismiss• 
Counsel for the Rebers is to prepare an Order consistent with 
this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for 
review and signature. 
Dated this / -day of January, 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SONY V. VISUAL 
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VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an 




CASE NO. 020903207 
The Court has before it the Reply Memorandum filed by the 
plaintiff in support of its Objection to Proposed Order on Motion 
to Dismiss. The prior Court's Ruling, dated April 22, 2003, gave 
the plaintiff an opportunity to reply to the defendants' contention 
that they have a legal basis for seeking attorney's fees, raised 
for the first time in an opposition to Sony's Objection. Having 
now reviewed the Objection, the defendants' Response and the 
recently filed Reply, the Court determines that the Rebers are 
entitled to attorney's fees under the Guaranty. 
First, the Court addresses Sony's argument that the defendants 
are not entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Guaranty 
because they successfully argued that the Guaranty is unenforceable 
in this case. To reiterate, this Court's decision was that the 
SONY V. VISUAL 
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defendants could not be held liable under the Guaranty, under these 
specific set of facts. Sony is extrapolating this decision to the 
illogical conclusion that the entire Guaranty (including the 
attorney's fees provision) is no longer enforceable. Clearly, all 
of the parties acknowledged that the Guaranty was enforceable 
because the Rebers had failed to properly revoke it. In fact, the 
Guaranty remains operative and could again impose guaranty duties 
upon the Rebers if the entity whose performance was guaranteed 
began to accrue debts from Sony. Despite the fact that the 
Guaranty remains enforceable, the Court found that the Rebers were 
still not liable under the Guaranty for debts accrued by an 
unrelated entity. Therefore, contrary to Sony's assertions, the 
defendants did not (and could not) have "sought a ruling that no 
cause of action can ever exist [under the Guaranty] , under any set 
of facts." Instead, the ruling was limited to the set of facts 
before the Court. 
Having found that the Guaranty remains operative, the Court 
also concludes that the attorney's fee provision in the Guaranty 
together with the reciprocal fee statute (Utah Code Annotated §78-
27-56.5) provide the defendants with an avenue for seeking 
attorney's fees. Sony is correct that this statute establishes a 
discretionary standard for awarding fees. However, the Court is 
not persuaded by Sony's argument that the defendants' alleged 
^ L 
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failure to comply with certain notice provisions in the Guaranty is 
a reasonable basis to deny attorney's fees altogether. While it is 
true that the defendants did not formally revoke their Guaranty, 
the documents attached to Sony's Complaint evidence its awareness 
that it was dealing with a new entity under a separate Reseller 
Agreement. Therefore, the failure to revoke is not the type of 
egregious conduct that would warrant this Court declining to award 
attorney's fees in spite of a clear contractual and statutory basis 
for awarding such fees. Accordingly, the Court denies Sony's 
Objection. The defendants are to re-submit their proposed Order, 
with the inclusion of attorney's fees. 
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying Sony's Objection. 
^-1-1 
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VISUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, ERLAND REBER, an 
individual, and SHARLENE REBER, an 
individual, : 
Defendants. : 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 020903207 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Erland and Sharlene Reberfs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint against them 
came on for hearing before the Court, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding, on November 6, 2002. 
Present and appearing with and on behalf of the Rebers was their counsel Elizabeth M. Peck, and 
present and appearing for Plaintiff Sony Electronics, Inc. was its counsel of record, David E. Leta and 
Kimberly A. Havlik of Snell & Wilmer. Following oral argument from counsel, this Court took the 
matter under advisement to consider further the arguments and written submissions of the parties, 
relevant case law and statutes, all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral arguments in this case. Having 
been fully advised and good cause appearing therefor, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision on 
r l l H I DISTRICT SOBS? 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 25 2003 
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January 7, 2003 from which it makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW and ORDER: 
At the hearing, the issue of whether this Court would treat the Rebers' Motion to Dismiss as 
one for summary judgment was raised. This Court reiterates its decision not to convert the Motion to 
Dismiss to a summary judgment motion as no new matters outside the pleading were raised by the 
Motion, and as such, the Court considered only the Complaint and the documents attached to it in 
making this decision. 
Findings of Fact: 
1. The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the Rebers were liable to Plaintiff for certain 
debts incurred by the above named co-defendant Visual Technology, Inc. under a Guaranty 
Agreement executed by the Rebers in favor of Plaintiff in 1989 (the "Guaranty"). 
2. The Rebers filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), contending that they are not liable to Plaintiff under the Guaranty because the debt forming 
the basis for Plaintiffs Complaint was incurred by a wholly separate entity than the entity whose debts 
were the subject of the Guaranty. 
3. The relief requested by the Rebers1 Motion to Dismiss, and supporting Memorandum 
was for both a dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint against them and for the award their reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs. 
4. In opposing the Rebers' Motion, Plaintiffs focus on the fact that the Rebers did not 
revoke the Guaranty and it therefore continues in effect regardless of changes to Visual Technology in 
terms of its officers and name. 
5. In this case, there are two parallel corporations who share the same name. 
2 an 
6. This first corporation, Visual Technology (I) no longer exists. It is the corporation 
whose debts the Rebers guaranteed. 
7. The second corporation, Visual Technology (II), is a wholly separate corporation 
which was formerly known as Dunston-Hill. 
8. The documents attached to the Complaint evidence that Plaintiff entered into a Reseller 
Agreement with the new debtor Visual Technology (II) on August 1, 2001. The address for the new 
debtor is different from the address of the debtor, Visual Technology (I), referenced in the Guaranty. 
9. From the date of the Reseller Agreement on August 1, 2001, it appears that Plaintiffs 
correspondence to Visual Technology was mailed to the new address and that Plaintiff dealt with the 
signatory to the Reseller Agreement, Mr. Bruce Jackson. (See letter dated 1/10/2002 from Mr. Cheng 
to Mr. Jackson.) 
10. This case does not involve a change in the financial structure or organization of the 
debtor which is the subject of the Guaranty, Visual Technology (I). It involves a new debtor 
altogether, Visual Technology (II), which was not covered by the Guaranty in the first place. 
Conclusions of Law: 
11. Based upon the factual allegations of the Complaint and the accompanying documents, 
the Court determines that there are no facts under which Plaintiff can attempt to hold the Rebers liable 
under the Guaranty for debts incurred by Visual Technology (II), an entity which is wholly different 
from Visual Technology (I), the company for which the Rebers guaranteed payment. 
12. In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff strongly relies upon Mule-Hide Prods. Co. 
v. White, 438 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 2002). In Mule-Hide, the guarantor had not revoked her 
guaranty when the company, which was the subject of her guaranty, placed an order from Mule-Hide, 
which order was subsequently delivered and accepted. 
13. The facts of this case, and as set forth above, demonstrate that this case is clearly 
distinguishable from Mule-Hide. The company whose debts the Rebers guaranteed was not the same 
company which in fact ordered and received products from Plaintiff, the debt for which products is the 
subject of this action. It was Visual Technology (II), located at Bearcat Drive and whose president 
was Mr. Bruce Jackson, that ordered the products from Plaintiff pursuant to an entirely new 
Agreement as to which the Rebers were not even a party. 
14. Under the facts alleged in the Complaint and in light of the documents attached to the 
Complaint, there is no plausible way that the Rebers can be held liable under the Guaranty. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS the Rebers' Motion to Dismiss and ORDERS that the relief 
therein be granted, to wit, that the Complaint against them be dismissed and that they be awarded their 
reasonable attorney's fees of $8,124.00 as has been established by the Affidavit of Elizabeth M. Peck 
Regarding Attorney's Fees dated July 8, 2003 
DATED this 2 ^ day of 
iff 
~7! 
Approved as tolFi 
SNELL & WILME 
David Leta 
Kimberly Havlik 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Leslie A Lewis 
Third District Court Judge 
State of Utah 
5tM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of June . 2003,1 caused to be mailed, by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS to the following: 
David Leta 
Kimberly Havlik 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 W. South Temple, Ste. 1200 




Rules of Civil Procedure 
Q Rules of Civil Procedure 
Q PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute 
or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within 
twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is 
complete within the state and within thirty days after service of 
the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party 
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim 
shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after 
the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days 
after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. 
The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the 
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in 
a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining 
claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition 
until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, 
the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the 
service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for 
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack 
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading 
is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief 
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense 
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are 
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party 
may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated 
(l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a 
pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in 
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before 
trial on application on of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the 
trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a 
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 
pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before 
interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out 
the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion 
is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten 
days after notice of the order or within such other time as the 
court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the 
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before 
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is 
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or 
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under 
this rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for 
and then available. If a party makes a motion under this 
rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then 
available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses 
or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of 
this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and 
objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, 
except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the 
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be 
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence 
that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive 
pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these 
rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the 
plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign 
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the 
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be 
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by 
the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall 
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may 
be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required 
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails 
to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service 
of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter 
an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; amended 
effective November 1, 2000.) 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The 
motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in 
actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may 
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1987.) 
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Q Utah Statutes 
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Q CHAPTER 5 STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note 
or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement; 
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of 
another; 
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of 
marriage, except mutual promises to marry; 
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer 
in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate; 
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation; and 
(f) every credit agreement. 
(2)(a) As used in Subsections (1)(f) and this Subsection (2): 
(i)(A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution 
to: 
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, 
or things in action; 
(II) otherwise extend credit; or 
(III) make any other financial accommodation. 
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary 
agreements related to deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms 
associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or 
extends a financial accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or 
receives a financial accommodation, under a credit agreement with a 
financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means: 
(A) a state or federally chartered: 
(I) bank; 
(II) savings and loan association; 
(III) savings bank; 
(IV) industrial bank; or 
(V) credit union; or 
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of 
Financial Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act. 
(b)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor or a creditor 
may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement: 
(A) is in writing; 
(B) expresses consideration; 
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and 
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement 
would be sought. 
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constitutes a signed 
agreement, if the creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed 
agreement from the debtor when granting the application. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit 
agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of 
fiduciary or other business relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or 
printed provision giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is 
a final expression of the agreement between the creditor and debtor and the 
written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral 
agreement. The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or 
other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement. 
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature 
by the party to be charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the 
agreement; 
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall 
constitute acceptance of those terms; and 
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person 
authorized by the debtor, requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement 
or otherwise uses the credit offered. 
TabG 
Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 78 JUDICIAL CODE 
Q PART III PROCEDURE 
Q CHAPTER 27 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorneyf s fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney1s fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
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